

VZCZCXRO8324

PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN  
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG  
DE RUEHMO #0003/01 0010733  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH  
P 010733Z JAN 09  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1412  
INFO RUEHDX/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE  
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE  
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000003

SENSITIVE  
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MARR](#) [KNNP](#) [OREP](#) [RS](#)

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARY NAZAROV MEETING WITH  
CODEL TAUSCHER

¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a December 15 meeting with CODEL Tauscher, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov called the lack of trust the main obstacle for U.S. and Russian cooperation, followed by ineffective mechanisms to guarantee security. Nazarov claimed that U.S. assistance to Georgia made the U.S. guilty of participating in "genocide," and criticized the NATO-Russia Council. In order to rebuild trust, Nazarov called for an arms control verification mechanism, welcomed U.S. congressional efforts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and advocated for an agreement on the non-offensive military use of space, as well as an additional Nonproliferation Treaty protocol for non-signatory countries such as Iran to participate. Nazarov agreed that Iran must not acquire nuclear weapons, but disagreed over the means to achieve that end. Rejecting sanctions as "groundless," he urged a dialogue with Tehran. Nazarov stated Russia did not think Iran had made the political decision yet to acquire nuclear arms, and claimed there was no proof to date of a hidden enrichment project. Nazarov welcomed the delegation's proposal that missile defense would only be activated if there was a confirmed missile threat from Iran, but cautioned that Russia would only cooperate on regional missile defense if there was also cooperation on global missile defense. Nazarov said the CFE was not a cornerstone of European security, and needed to be "brought into agreement with modern reality." End summary.

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Lack of trust  
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¶2. (SBU) In a December 15 meeting, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov agreed with Representative Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), Representative Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), Representative Rick Larsen (D-WA), and Representative Doug Lamborn (R-CO) that joint U.S.-Russian cooperation was essential in order to reach agreement on extending the START Treaty, the Nonproliferation Treaty due for review in 2010, and dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

He noted that former Secretary of Defense William Perry during a visit to Moscow last week in a similar vein had listed economic cooperation, climate change, arms control, terrorism, and nonproliferation as other areas of potential cooperation.

¶3. (SBU) However, Nazarov stressed that the GOR's main concern was about two different issues: first, the lack of trust between the U.S. and Russia, and second, the ineffectiveness of mechanisms to guarantee security. To illustrate the lack of trust, which he called Russia's "number one priority," Nazarov raised alleged USG promises that the U.S. would work with Georgian president Saakashvili to reduce the risk of aggression, and assurances that the presence of U.S. military advisors in Georgia was nothing to worry about. However, Georgia had invaded South Ossetia notwithstanding, Nazarov charged.

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"U.S. participated in genocide"  
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14. (SBU) Nazarov further claimed Georgia had terminated advanced negotiations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Secretary Rice had visited Tbilisi, and later begun preparations for the operation in South Ossetia. Given that the U.S. had assisted Georgia in these preparations by supplying aid and advisors, Nazarov accused the U.S. of "participating in genocide." He said the U.S. needed to understand this Russian view, as a misunderstanding in that point would make it more difficult to achieve a common understanding elsewhere.

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NRC is not working  
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15. (SBU) Nazarov also criticized the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which he described as an intended crisis management mechanism designed to create trust, with all members having "their own voices." Instead it had become a venue where NATO spoke as one bloc against Russia.

16. (SBU) Nazarov further charged that when the Georgian conflict broke out in August, Russian authorities unsuccessfully tried for one full day to reach Secretary Rice and the President, only getting through after Russian forces had repulsed the Georgians. He claimed that Russian requests for the NRC to convene were rejected, as the U.S. had not yet "brought the other NATO partners into line." Therefore, Russia had little trust in the NRC, Nazarov stated.

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Rebuilding trust  
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17. (SBU) Responding to Representative Larson's question what "hoops

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the U.S. needed to jump through" in order to regain Russia's trust, Nazarov advocated that the new U.S. administration not take up old stereotypes, and cooperate on the issues mentioned earlier (para 1).

Nazarov proposed adding the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the military use of space, and missile defense to the list of issues to address in order to rebuild trust.

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Arms control  
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18. (SBU) Nazarov called for an arms control verification mechanism, rejecting any agreement that relied solely on voluntary demonstrations of compliance. Dedicated channels within a framework of legal rules were necessary in order to pass confidential information about warheads and delivery vehicles.

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)  
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19. (SBU) Representative Tauscher indicated that a bill on the ratification of the CTBT had been submitted to the current Congress, while U.S. President-elect Barack Obama had pledged to seek Senate approval again in the next session of Congress, if necessary. She noted the IAEA needed more funding and more "teeth." Nazarov expressed Russia's strong support for the legislators' efforts to secure approval of the CTBT bill, but noted that there were many "powerful people" in high positions in Russia who considered nuclear tests essential to maintain the functionality of Russia's nuclear arsenal.

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Military use of space  
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10. (SBU) Nazarov again recalled his talks with Bill Perry, who had called for an agreement on the non-offensive military use of space. This was another area of U.S.-Russian agreement, Nazarov said, as the GOR considered the issue to be a big factor for ensuring strategic stability.



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Nonproliferation  
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¶11. (SBU) On nonproliferation, Nazarov asserted that Russia was "showing everybody" that it complied with Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls on all signatories "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures" to end the arms race, and to negotiate a treaty on total disarmament. While Russia was decreasing its nuclear arsenal, Nazarov suggested that an additional protocol was necessary for non-signatory countries to participate. Representative Tauscher agreed, affirming that the key element in Article VI was the dismantlement of weapons, not just their storage. This was why the renewal of the START treaty was crucial.

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Iran  
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¶12. (SBU) Nazarov noted that, due to Iran and Russia's shared border, Russia's strong desire for a non-nuclear Iran was understandable. However, the question was how to reach that common goal. Nazarov urged for establishing unity in negotiations among the "Big 6" (U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China). Charging that the sanctions imposed by President Bush against Iran were groundless and had no basis in international law, he quipped, "either we cooperate, or you sanction Rosoberonexport. Both don't work."

¶13. (SBU) Representative Tauscher replied that the U.S. had a violent past with Iran, and no formal relations for 30 years. For that reason, sanctions were the only tool remaining to influence Iran. Allowing that that instrument was not very effective in the 21st century, especially against a country which had lived so well despite sanctions, she questioned what other possibilities of influencing Iran remained. Nazarov noted that the U.S. position with regard to other nuclear threshold countries had changed in the past, for example with regard to India and Pakistan. After sanctioning Russia for cooperating with India on its nuclear program, the U.S. now hoped to replace Russia as India's key partner in atomic energy projects, he charged. Nazarov suggested that the next U.S. administration might consider the Bushehr power station project to be one that supported stability in Iran, and helped impede Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

¶14. (SBU) Representative Tauscher pushed for unity in opposing

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Iran's clandestine enrichment programs, especially given the lack of the rule of law in the country, and Iran's close ties to Hamas and other terrorist groups. She asserted that the U.S. and Russia needed to stop Iran's enrichment program, and put similar pressure on the sixty other countries without mature governments or stable borders, which were trying to acquire nuclear power plants without closed fuel cycles. Inspections were a key element. President-elect Obama would likely continue the low-level engagement with Iran started by the Bush administration, in order to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

¶15. (SBU) Nazarov repeated that Russia disagreed with the U.S. on the tactics, not on the goal, and suggested it would be a great achievement if the U.S. and Russia were to both speak with Iran. He described that he had been working on Iran issues for 20 years, and every year heard that Iran was about two-five years away from acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore it was necessary to share information actively in unprejudiced conversation, in order to clarify points on Iran's past nuclear activities. Russia did not think Iran had made the political decision yet to acquire nuclear arms, and claimed there was no proof to date of a hidden project, nor did Russian monitors currently see an aggravation of the situation.

¶16. (SBU) Responding to a question by Representative Lamborn, Nazarov confirmed Russia had seen Iran's centrifuges, but asserted



they were ineffective and had "no future." While the Type 2 centrifuges were more dangerous, Iran did not have many of those, and was experiencing problems with them. For this reason, Iran should be encouraged to join the proposed additional NPT protocol, in order to guarantee monitoring, which he agreed was most important.

¶17. (SBU) Nazarov then lamented that Secretary Rice during her tenure as National Security Advisor had maintained close contact with the Russian Security Council, but once at the State Department had let those contacts expire, concentrating only on the Russian MFA instead. He affirmed the Security Council's willingness to cooperate on mutual evaluations and on balancing the "carrots and sticks" for use with Iran.

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Missile Defense (MD)  
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¶18. (SBU) Representative Tauscher informed Nazarov that the U.S. Congress had said there would be no deployment of missiles in Poland until the systems had been tested and certified effective, and offered not to activate the system until there was a confirmed missile threat from Iran. Nazarov welcomed the last element on non-activation as very important to Russia, but called for even more -- the demonstration that the MD system did not pose a threat to Russia. He suggested the U.S. and Russia could jointly analyze threats, and analyze together the possibilities for cooperation to eliminate threats.

¶19. (SBU) Representative Tauscher suggested building mutual trust by cooperating on the short-to-medium range missile systems, currently not expected off the drawing board for lack of funds. Together with START, this could be an area for confidence building that would also attract other countries' cooperation. Nazarov cautioned that Russia would cooperate on regional missile defense if there was also cooperation on global missile defense, but so far had only made bad experiences. He illustrated this with the joke about the Mongolian astronaut who returned from a joint U.S.-Mongolian space flight with aching hands, complaining that every time he tried to touch something, he got his hands slapped down.

¶20. (SBU) Representative Sanchez repeated the offer to cooperate on regional MD, noting the technology existed, despite financial constraints, while long-range MD still required a lot of testing.

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Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)  
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¶21. (SBU) Nazarov said the CFE was not a cornerstone of European security, and needed to be "brought into agreement with modern reality." This was not a problem of the 1999 Istanbul Agreements, however. Nazarov voiced his hope that the new U.S. administration would widen contacts and cooperation with Russia on this and other issues.

¶22. (U) Codel Tauscher did not clear this cable.

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